Abstract: We determine the optimal investment strategy of an individual who targets a given rate of consumption and who seeks to minimize the probability of going bankrupt before she dies, also known as lifetime ruin. We impose two types of borrowing constraints: First, we do not allow the individual to borrow money to invest in the risky asset nor to sell the risky asset short. However, the latter is not a real restriction because in the unconstrained case, the individual does not sell the risky asset short. Second, we allow the individual to borrow money but only at a rate that is higher than the rate earned on the riskless asset.
Introduction
There is growing concern among Americans about financial ruin during retirement (Parikh, 2003) . These concerns are justified because a significant financial crisis is looming; it is projected that retired Americans' living expenses will exceed their financial resources by $400 billion over the ten-year period 2020 -2030 (VenDerhei and Copeland, 2003 . This shortfall is driven by demographic trends, the increased longevity of our aging population, changes in Social Security, inadequate private retirement savings, and the continuing trend toward defined contribution plans, such as 401(k)s, under which the individual -not the employer -assumes all investment and longevity risk.
We employ techniques of stochastic optimal control to study the problem of how an individual should invest her wealth in a risky financial market in order to minimize the probability that she outlives her wealth, also known as the probability of lifetime ruin (Milevsky and Robinson, 2000) . Specifically, we determine the optimal investment strategy of an individual who targets a given rate of consumption and who seeks to minimize the probability of lifetime ruin. As employers shift from defined benefit plans to defined contribution plans, the problem of outliving one's wealth becomes relevant to more retirees and to the actuaries and financial planners who advise them. A recent issue of The Actuary (Parikh, 2003) points out that "according to the Employee Benefit Research Institute, in 1974, fifty-six percent of retirement income was coming from guaranteed sources. . . . Cerulli
Associates projects that will drop to twenty-four percent by 2030." When an individual seeks to find an optimal investment policy, the resulting optimal policy depends on her optimization criterion. The most common optimization criterion encountered in the finance literature is to maximize one's expected discounted utility of consumption and bequest. In the 1970s, Merton (1992) began study of this problem, and many others continued his work; see, for example, Karatzas and Shreve (1998, Chapter 3) and the discussion at the end of that chapter for further references. Notable extensions include the work of Davis and Norman (1990) , Zariphopoulou (1992) , and Shreve and Soner (1994) on portfolio selection with transaction costs; Duffie and Zariphopoulou (1993) , Duffie et al. (1997) , and Koo (1998) on optimal investment and consumption strategies to maximize expected utility of consumption and bequest in the presence of stochastic income;
and Fleming and Zariphopoulou (1991) and Zariphopoulou (1994) on optimal investment under borrowing and trading constraints, respectively. See Zariphopoulou (1999 Zariphopoulou ( , 2001 ) for helpful summaries of the work to date in this area. The goal of maximizing expected discounted utility of consumption and bequest may be difficult to implement because it depends on a subjective utility function for consumption and bequest. Minimizing the probability of running out of money before dying might prove easier for individuals to understand because that criterion is arguably more objective. Indeed, there is something intuitively appealing about minimizing the probability of shortfall that lends itself to asset allocation advice. In fact, the Nobel laureate William Sharpe founded a financial services advisory firm that is largely based on using probabilities to provide investment advice.
Other researchers have used the criterion of minimizing the probability of ruin of an insurance company to find the optimal rate of new business accumulation (Hipp and Taksar, 2000) , to find the optimal investment strategy for the insurer (Hipp and Plum, 2000) , and to find the optimal proportional reinsurance for the insurer (Schmidli, 2001) . Similarly, Olivieri and Pitacco (2003) consider the problem of maintaining solvency for a pension plan.
From the individual investor's standpoint, which the view we take in this paper, Browne (1997) considers a financial model similar to ours (however, with no constraints on borrowing), and he maximizes the probability of reaching a safe level before ruining; also, see Browne (1995 Browne ( , 1999a for related work. This existence of the safe level is based on constant consumption and equals the price of a perpetuity that exactly covers the desired consumption. He showed that no optimal policy exists for this problem because it is impossible to get to the safe region if one is maximizing this probability. Our problem differs from his because we allow the individual to die before ruining, so that the individual can thereby "win" the game. Plus, we optimize a different probability, namely the probability of ruining before dying.
In minimizing the probability that the individual outlives her money, we consider her random time of death, unlike Browne (1997) . This assumption differs from the one usually assumed by financial planners and common retirement planning software in that they generally assume a specific age of death. A few earlier researchers have dealt with the problem of outliving one's wealth under the assumption of a random lifetime. For example, Milevsky, Ho, and Robinson (1997) and Milevsky and Robinson (2000) consider a random time of death modeled by using Canadian mortality data. They use simulation to find the probability of lifetime ruin. Our work differs from Milevsky, Ho, and Robinson (1997) and Milevsky and Robinson (2000) in that we find the optimal dynamic investment strategy to minimize the probability of lifetime ruin, while they take the investment strategy as fixed and find the corresponding probability of lifetime ruin. Young (2004) considered the problem of minimizing the probability of lifetime ruin when the individual continuously consumes either a constant (real) dollar amount or a constant proportion of wealth. For the most part, the results are intuitively appealing; as the model parameters vary, the changes in the ruin probability and the asset allocation are consistent with financial intuition. However, when consumption is constant, she found that for wealth near 0, the optimal strategy is a heavily-leveraged position in the risky asset; that is, the individual borrows money to invest in the risky asset. In order to avoid (nearly certain) ruin at low wealth levels, the individual takes on the lesser risk of borrowing a great deal of money at the riskless rate and investing it in the risky asset. Although the objective of minimizing the probability of lifetime ruin is intuitively appealing, this leveraging at low wealth is not.
In this paper, we consider two model changes; one eliminates the leveraging, and the other reduces it. In Section 2, we do not allow the individual to borrow money at all. In Section 2.1, we present the financial model and define the corresponding probability of ruin. In Section 2.2, we consider a constant rate of consumption, while in Section 2.3, we consider a rate of consumption that is proportional to wealth. In the latter case, we show that our individual behaves exactly as an individual who maximizes expected discounted utility of consumption under a similar no-borrowing constraint and under power utility. In Section 3, we parallel the work of Section 2 under the financial model that the individual can borrow money but only at a rate that is higher than the rate earned on the riskless asset. In Section 4, we present a numerical example to demonstrate the results of Sections 2 and 3. Section 5 concludes the paper.
Probability of Lifetime Ruin: No Borrowing
In this section, we consider the problem of minimizing the probability of lifetime ruin when the individual is not allowed to borrow money. We also impose the constraint that she cannot sell the risky asset short; however, this constraint is moot because she does not wish to short-sell the risky asset in the unconstrained case. This occurs because we assume that the drift on the risky asset exceeds the rate of return on the riskless asset. In Section 2.1, we present the financial market and define the probability of ruin. In Section 2.2, we solve for the probability of ruin in the case for which consumption is constant. Section 2.3 parallels Section 2.2 in the case for which consumption is proportional to wealth. We show how this latter case is related to optimal investment and consumption in a Merton model with no borrowing.
Financial Market
In this section, we first present the financial ingredients that make up the individual's wealth, namely, consumption, a riskless asset, and a risky asset. We, then, define the minimum probability of lifetime ruin under the constraint of no borrowing (and no shortselling, although this is not a real restriction).
The individual consumes at a continuous rate c(w), in which w is her current wealth.
In this paper, we consider two forms of the consumption function:
(1) c(w) = c; the individual consumes at a constant (nominal or real) dollar rate c. If c is a real dollar rate, then returns in the financial market are real, too.
(2) c(w) = pw; the individual consumes a constant proportion p of her wealth.
We assume that the individual invests in a riskless asset whose price at time t, X t , follows the process dX t = rX t dt, X 0 = x > 0, for some fixed rate of interest r > 0. Also, the individual invests in a risky asset whose price at time t, S t , follows geometric Brownian motion given by
in which µ > r, σ > 0, and B is a standard Brownian motion with respect to a filtration of the probability space (Ω, F , Pr).
Let W t be the wealth at time t of the individual, and let π 0,t be the amount that the decision maker invests in the risky asset at that time. We use a subscript 0 to denote the fact that no borrowing (or short-selling) is allowed. It follows that the amount invested in the riskless asset is W t − π 0,t . Thus, wealth follows the process
By "outliving her wealth," or equivalently "lifetime ruin," we mean that the individual's wealth reaches zero before she dies. Let τ 0 denote the first time that wealth equals zero, and let τ d denote the random time of death of our individual. We assume that τ d is exponentially distributed with parameter λ (that is, with expected time of death equal to 1/λ); this parameter is also known as the hazard rate of the individual.
Denote the minimum probability that the individual outlives her wealth by ψ 0 (w), in which the argument w indicates that one conditions on the individual possessing wealth w at the current time. Recall that the subscript 0 reminds us that no borrowing is allowed.
Thus, ψ 0 is the minimum probability that τ 0 < τ d , in which one minimizes with respect to admissible investment strategies π 0 . A strategy π 0 is admissible if it is F t -progressively measurable (in which F t is the augmentation of σ(W s : 0 ≤ s ≤ t)) and if it satisfies the integrability condition t 0 π 2 0,s ds < ∞, almost surely, for all t ≥ 0. Also, in this section, we restrict π 0,t ∈ [0, W t ]; that is, no borrowing nor short-selling is allowed. Because µ > r, the latter is effectively not a restriction. It follows that one can express ψ 0 as follows:
For every α ∈ R, we associate a second-order differential operator L α with this minimization problem as follows: For every open set G ⊂ R + and for every h ∈ C 2 (G), we
We use L α in the following sections to characterize the minimum probability of ruin ψ 0 in the cases for which c(w) = c and c(w) = pw, respectively.
Constant Consumption
In this section, we consider the case for which the consumption rate c(w) = c, a positive constant. Note that when wealth reaches c/r, then the individual can place all her wealth in the riskless asset and consume c continuously without risk of running out of money. Therefore, the probability of lifetime ruin equals 0 when wealth is greater than or equal to c/r.
Define the stopping time τ = τ d ∧ τ c/r , in which τ c/r = inf{t > 0 : W t = c/r}, with the convention that inf ∅ = ∞. It follows that ψ 0 (w) = inf π 0 ∈A Pr [τ 0 < τ |W 0 = w], in which A is the set of admissible strategies. We have the following verification theorem. 
(v) h 0 (0) = 1, and h 0 (w) = 0 for w ≥ c/r.
Under the above conditions, the minimum probability of the lifetime ruin ψ 0 is given 5) and the optimal investment strategy in the risky asset π * 0 is given by
Proof. Assume that we have h 0 as specified in the statement of this theorem. Let N denote a Poisson process with rate λ such that N independent of the Brownian motion B driving the wealth. The first occurrence of N represents the death of the individual.
Let α be some function on [0, c/r] such that 0 ≤ α(w) ≤ w. Let W α denote the wealth process when we use α as the investment policy, and let α s = α(W α s ). Let ∆ represent the "coffin state," and let R + ∪ {∆} be the one point compactification of R + . For any function f : R + → R + , we define its extension to R + ∪ ∆ by assigning f (∆) = 0. We kill the wealth process as soon as the Poisson process jumps (that is, when the individual dies) and assign
By applying Itô's lemma, we have
The second equality follows from the definition of L α and the fact that h 0 (W α τ d ) = 0. Now if we take the expectation of both sides, the expectation of the third term in (2.7) becomes zero because
The first inequality in (2.8) follows from assumption (ii) of the theorem. E w denotes the conditional expectation given W 0 = w.
Then, we have 9) where the inequality follows from assumption (iii) of the theorem. The expression in (2.9) shows that h 0 (W α t∧τ 0 ∧τ ) t≥0 is a sub-martingale. (2.10) in which 1 is the indicator function. By taking expectations of both sides of (2.10), we have
Pr w denotes the conditional probability given W 0 = w. We write τ α 0 to emphasize the dependence of τ 0 on the strategy α. The last inequality follows from an aplication of optional sampling theorem since h 0 (W α t∧τ 0 ∧τ ) t≥0 is a sub-martingale. (We can apply optional sampling theorem due to Theorem 3.15 of Karatzas and Shereve (1991) since
(2.12)
Let α 0 be as specified in the statement of this theorem; that is, α 0 is the minimizer of
hence, we have demonstrated (2.5) and (2.6) on [0, c/r). Assumption (v) and the remark immediately preceding the statement of this theorem complete the proof. QED At this point, we could simply write down h 0 and α 0 and prove a theorem that they satisfy the hypotheses of Theorem 2.1, and we would be done. However, that would not show the reader how to solve such optimization problems. Therefore, in the remainder of this section, we demonstrate the steps of how to find h 0 and α 0 , and we summarize our results at the end.
In the unconstrained case (Young, 2004) , the minimum probability of ruin ψ is given by
14) Because ψ is convex, the corresponding unconstrained optimal investment in the risky asset π * is given by the first-order necessary condition implicit in items (iii) and (iv) of Theorem 2.1:
a non-negative, decreasing, linear function of wealth. Note that as wealth increases towards c/r, the amount invested in the risky asset decreases to zero. This makes sense because as the individual becomes wealthier, she does not need to take on as much risk to achieve her fixed consumption rate of c.
On the other hand, for wealth small, the (unconstrained) optimal amount invested in the risky asset is greater than wealth; that is, the individual borrows money to invest in the risky asset in order to avoid the greater risk of lifetime ruin. We believe that most people with small wealth will not borrow to invest in a risky asset to avoid ruin and that no credible financial advisor will give such advice. Therefore, it is reasonable to include the restriction that the amount invested in the risky asset cannot exceed current wealth.
In order to find h 0 and α 0 that satisfy Theorem 2.1, we hypothesize that they satisfy additional properties not explicitly stated in Theorem 2.1. If we find h 0 and α 0 that satisfy Theorem 2.1 and the additional properties, then these additional properties are implicit in Theorem 2.1 because of the uniqueness of h 0 on (0, c/r]. The function h 0 is unique, if it exists, because Theorem 2.1 states that if the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (defined by items (i) through (v)) has a solution, then that solution equals the minimum probability ψ 0 . We propose the following ansatz.
Ansatz: By considering the amount invested in the riskless asset in the unconstrained case, namely w − π * (w), we conjecture the form of the constrained α 0 . To that end, note that w − π * (w) is an increasing, linear function of wealth; also, the amount invested in the riskless asset for w = 0 is negative and for w = c/r is positive. Therefore, we hypothesize that the optimal constrained amount invested in the riskless asset is (1) a continuous function of wealth; (2) 0 for wealth below some level, say w l , and (3) positive for wealth greater than w l . The subscript l on w l stands for lending because for wealth above w l , the individual lends money to the financial institution selling the riskless asset. In other words, we suppose that the optimal investment in the riskless asset under the constraint of no borrowing is a truncated version of the optimal investment in the unconstrained case. We are not asserting that the wealth level above which the individual invests a positive amount in the riskless asset w l is the same in both cases; however, that turns out to be the case, as we note below. In addition to these properties of α 0 , we hypothesize that h 0 is strictly decreasing on [0, c/r].
Consider each of the two intervals (w l , c/r] and [0, w l ] in turn. First, consider (w l , c/r], on which we hypothesize that the borrowing constraint does not bind. We have the following proposition concerning h 0 on this interval. 
Proposition 2.2. Under the hypothesis that
identical to π * in the unconstrained case.
Proof. From items (iii), (iv), and (v) of Theorem 2.1, we solve 20) with boundary conditions h 0 (c/r) = 0. We also have the boundary condition h ′ 0 (c/r), which we demonstrate now. Consider the solution φ of (2.20) with λ = 0. Certainly, we have h 0 ≤ φ on an interval (c/r − δ, c/r] for some δ > 0 because the probability of ruining before dying is no greater than the probability of ruining before infinity. If we show that
(c/r) because h 0 is wedged between 0 and φ as wealth approaches 0. Note that φ solves the equation
with φ(c/r) = 0. From Pestien and Sudderth (1985) , the optimal investment strategy α * is the one that maximizes the ratio of the drift to the variance, or equivalently,
The value of α that maximizes this expression is α * (w) = 2(c − rw)/(µ − r). On the other hand, we also have that
from the first-order condition necessary in (2.21). Thus,
It follows that the optimal solution α 0 is as large as possible on that neighborhood, contradicting our hypothesis that the borrowing constraint does not hold on (w l , c/r]. Therefore, to be consistent with this hypothesis, h 0 is convex on (w l , c/r], and we consider the Legendre transformh of h 0 defined bỹ
Note that we can recover h 0 fromh by
The minimizing value of w in (2.25) 27) in which m is given in (2.16). The general solution of (2.27) is 28) in whichD 1 andD 2 are constants to be determined, andB 1 andB 2 are the positive and negative roots, respectively of
Thus,
From the definition ofh in (2.25) and
It follows thatD 2 = 0. We can, then, recover h 0 from (2.28) and (2.26) and obtain the expression for h 0 in (2.18).
Because h 0 is convex on (w l , c/r], the optimal policy α 0 is given by the first-order necessary condition in (2.20). This observation leads to the expression for α 0 given in equation (2.19) . QED Corollary 2.3. By the assumed continuity of α 0 , 33) in which
, the lending level w l is the same in both the unconstrained case and in the no-borrowing case, in which the lending level is the wealth level above which the individual invests a positive amount in the riskless asset. We find this result rather surprising because we expected that the individual would have a higher lending level in the constrained case in order to invest more money in the risky asset due to the fact that she cannot invest as much in the risky asset as she wishes when her wealth is below w l . We will see this myopia again in Section 3 when we consider the case of borrowing at a rate higher than the lending rate.
Next, consider the interval [0, w l ], on which α 0 (w) = w. We have the following proposition concerning h 0 on this interval. We state it without proof because it easily follows from Theorem 2.1 and from our hypothesis that α 0 (w) = w on [0, w l ].
Proposition 2.4. Under the hypothesis that
with boundary conditions
These two boundary conditions allow us to solve the second-order ode (2.35) numerically. Once we have a solution for h 0 on [0, w l ], then we can use the condition h 0 (w l −) = h 0 (w l +) to determine the remaining unknown parameter β 0 .
It remains for us to show that if h 0 is given as the solution of (2.35) − (2.37), then the constrained optimal investment in the risky asset is equal to the current wealth. We state this formally in the following proposition.
Proof. Define the parabola f by
Proving this proposition is equivalent to showing that 
We complete the proof of this proposition by proving the following lemma.
Lemma 2.6. y > z on (0, w l ), with equality at w = 0 and w = w l .
Proof. By substituting in the linear second-order differential equation (2.35), we obtain a non-linear first-order differential equation for y on [0, w l ]:
The function z given by (2.43) solves a similar differential equation:
. Indeed, after substituting for y(w l ) in (2.44) and simplifying, we obtain
By substituting for d in (2.46), we have that y ′ (w l ) < z ′ (w l ) if and only if
which, because µ > r, holds if
Inequality (2.48) is true as one can see by squaring both sides and simplifying. Thus, we have shown that
It follows that y > z on (w l − δ, w l ) for some δ > 0. Next, suppose that there exists w * ∈ (0, w l ) such that y(w * ) = z(w * ) and y > z on (w * , w l ). We will show that such a w * cannot exist.
Because y(w * ) = z(w * ) and y > z on (w * , w l ), we have y
(2.49)
Note that the right-hand-side of the last line of (2.49) is positive. Therefore, if µ+r 2λ ≥ 1, then we have our contradiction.
To continue, suppose µ+r 2λ < 1. In that case, the inequality in (2.49) becomes
, then w * ∈ (0, w l ) cannot exist, and we are done. Now, by substituting for w l and simplifying, one can show that w l < 2c(µ−r) σ 2 (2λ−µ−r)+(µ 2 −r 2 ) is equivalent to inequality (2.47), which we have already demonstrated. Therefore, no such w * exists, and y > z on (0, w l ). QED
We have the following theorem that summarizes the results of this section.
Theorem 2.7. For constant consumption c(w) = c, the constrained minimum probability of ruin
51)
in which h 0 solves (2.35) − (2.37) with w l in (2.33), and
The optimal investment strategy is given by
One can show that if initial wealth lies below c/r, then it never reaches that "safe" level; that is, τ α 0 c/r = ∞. See Young (2004) and Browne (1997) for discussions of this phenomenon in related models. In Section 4, we present numerical examples that demonstrate the results of this section.
Proportional Consumption
In this section, we consider the case for which the consumption rate is proportional to wealth c(w) = pw, in which p > r. Note that if we specify that ruin occurs if wealth reaches 0, then the individual with this consumption function does not ruin. Therefore, for this case, we say that ruin occurs when wealth reaches w 0 > 0; that is, let τ 0 in definition (2.3) be the (first) time that wealth reaches w 0 .
We have the following verification theorem whose proof we omit because it is similar to the proof for Theorem 2.1. 
(v) g 0 (0) = 1, and lim w→∞ g 0 (w) = 0.
Under the above conditions, the minimum probability of the lifetime ruin ψ 0 is given 54) and the optimal investment strategy in the risky asset π * 0 is given by
In the unconstrained case (Young, 2004) , the minimum probability of ruin ψ is given by 57) and m is as in (2.16). Note that −a r equals d in (2.15) with r replaced by r − p. Because ψ is convex, the corresponding unconstrained optimal investment in the risky asset π * is given by the first-order necessary condition implicit in items (iii) and (iv) of Theorem 2.8: Theorem 2.9. The constrained minimum probability of ruin is given by
The corresponding constrained optimal investment strategy is given by
Proof. Note that if g(w) solves the equation 62) then g(αw) and βg(w) also solve the equation for any α > 0 and β > 0. Because g 0 (w 0 ) = 1, we have that g α defined by g α (w) = g 0 (αw) solves (2.62) with g α (w 0 /α) = 1. Also,ĝ β defined byĝ β (w) = βg 0 (w) solves (2.62) withĝ β (w 0 /α) = βg 0 (w 0 /α). Set β = 1/g 0 (w 0 /α); then,ĝ β (w 0 /α) = 1, and by uniqueness of g 0 , we have that g α (w) =ĝ β (w) for all w > 0.
We, therefore, have demonstrated the following functional equation for g 0 :
Under mild regularity conditions on ρ, such as left-or right-continuity, it is well-known that ρ is a power function, say w −a , for some a ∈ R. Thus, g 0 is given by
for a > 0 because g 0 is decreasing.
All that remains is for us to determine the value of a under various ranges of parameters. Items (iii) and (iv) in Theorem 2.8 lead us to solve 66) which reduces to
The quantity in square brackets is minimized by γ = w if
. In the former case, a = a r in (2.57); in the latter, a = k in (2.60). QED Thus, the optimal investment strategy is same strategy as in the unconstrained case but truncated by w if necessary.
Finally, we indicate how the results of this section are related to those under the same financial model (including the constraint of no borrowing) for an individual who maximizes her expected discounted utility of consumption, when the utility function exhibits constant relative risk aversion (CRRA). We give the parameter values of the utility maximization problem that lead to identical consumption and investment strategies as we found for the individual who minimizes her probability of lifetime ruin. Young (2004) found a similar parallel in the unconstrained case.
Specifically, the utility function is of the form 68) and the corresponding value function is given by 69) in which β is a personal discount factor, and the supremum is taken over admissible constrained investment strategies as in the definition of ψ 0 in (2.3).
Let β = λ + p. One can adapt the arguments in Fleming and Zariphopoulou (1991) 
< 1, then the investor who minimizes her probability of lifetime ruin behaves as a CRRA utility maximizer with η = −a r , or equivalently, with CRRA = 1 + a r .
(ii) If
≥ 1, then the investor who minimizes her probability of lifetime ruin behaves as a CRRA utility maximizer with η = −k, or equivalently, with CRRA = 1 + k.
In other words, if we see an investor behaving as prescribed in this section, then we do not know whether she is minimizing her probability of lifetime ruin under proportional consumption or maximizing her utility of consumption under power utility. It is interesting that we get this parallel when the personal discount factor β = λ + p. The discount β measures the individual's impatience. The higher the hazard rate λ or the proportion consumed p, the greater the impatience, which corresponds with our intuition.
Probability of Lifetime Ruin: Borrowing Rate Higher than Lending Rate
In this section, we consider the problem of minimizing the probability of lifetime ruin when the individual is allowed to borrow money at a rate b that is higher than the lending rate r. In Section 3.1, we present the financial market. In Section 3.2, we solve for the probability of ruin in the case for which consumption is constant. Section 3.3 parallels Section 3.2 in the case for which consumption is proportional to wealth. We show how this latter case is related to optimal investment and consumption in a Merton model with borrowing, as considered in Fleming and Zariphopoulou (1991) .
Financial Market
We assume that the individual invests a non-negative amount in a riskless asset that earns interest at the constant rate r > 0. If the individual borrows money, then she pays interest at the rate b ≥ r. Also, the individual invests in a risky asset whose price follows geometric Brownian motion, as given in (2.1), in which µ > b ≥ r > 0. Let W t be the wealth at time t of the individual, and let π b,t be the amount that the decision maker invests in the risky asset at that time. We use a subscript b to denote the fact that borrowing is allowed but only at a higher rate than the lending rate. It follows that the amount invested in the riskless asset is (W t − π b,t ) + , and the amount borrowed is (π b,t − W t ) + . Thus, wealth follows the process
In this case, we denote the minimal probability of ruin by ψ b and define it similarly as in (2.3), except that an admissible investment strategy allows borrowing and shortselling. For every α ∈ R, we associate a second-order differential operator D α with this minimization problem as follows: For every open set G ⊂ R + and for every h ∈ C 2 (G),
Also, recall the definition of L α given in (2.4). We use both differential operators in the following sections to characterize the minimum probability of ruin ψ b in the cases for which c(w) = c and c(w) = pw, respectively.
Constant Consumption
In this section, we consider the case for which the consumption rate c(w) = c, a positive constant, as in Section 2.2. As argued in that section, we have the probability of ruin equal to zero when wealth is at least c/r. We begin with a verification theorem whose proof we omit because it is similar to the one of Theorem 2.1. 
(ii) L α h b (w) ≥ 0, for w ∈ (0, c/r) and α ∈ R;
Under the above conditions, the minimum probability of the lifetime ruin ψ b is given by
3)
and the optimal investment strategy in the risky asset π * b is given by
As in Section 2.2, we demonstrate the steps of how to find h b and α b that satisfy the hypotheses of Theorem 3.1. Recall that in the case for which b = r, the amount invested in the riskless asset increases (linearly) from a negative amount when w = 0 (that is, the individual borrows money to invest in the risky asset) to a positive amount when w = c/r.
Ansatz:
We use this result to hypothesize that in the case with µ > b ≥ r, the amount invested in the riskless asset satisfies 
7)
identical to π * in the case for which b = r and to π * 0 in the no-borrowing case.
Corollary 3.3. By the assumed continuity of α b , it follows from (3.7) that w l is given by (2.33).
In other words, the lending level w l in the case with borrowing is identical to the lending level in the case for which b = r and in the no-borrowing case. Thus, we see the same myopia in this case that we saw in the no-borrowing case.
Next, consider the interval [w b , w l ], on which α b (w) = w. We have the following proposition concerning h b on this interval that we state without proof. 
with boundary condition
As in Section 2.2, we similarly define y on [w b , w l ] by
Note that y solves the differential equation (2.44) with boundary condition (3.9) and (3.10) at w = w l . Thus, the function y in (3.10) is identical to the one in Section 2.2. For that reason, we use the same letter y to denote this function. We use this function later in determining h b on [0, w b ), including determining w b itself.
Finally, consider the interval [0, w b ), on which we hypothesize that the individual borrows money at the rate b. Before stating a proposition concerning h b on this interval, we outline a program whereby one can determine h b from its Legendre transformh. By items (v) and (vi) of Theorem 3.1, the function h b solves
with boundary condition h b (0) = 1. Note that (3.11) is a fully-nonlinear differential equation, but we can linearize (3.11) by rewriting it in terms of the Legendre transform of
Note that we can recover h b fromh by (3.14) in which m b is defined as in (2.16) with r replaced by b. The general solution of (3.14) is (3.15) in which D 1 and D 2 are constants to be determined, and B 1 and B 2 are the positive and negative roots, respectively of
Thus, (3.17) and
Recall that we still do not know w b .
From the definition ofh in (3.12), at v = v 0 , we havẽ
To summarize where we are at this point: To determine h b on [0, c/r], we need to For the moment, assume that we know w b , and later we show how to obtain it from the function y. Equations (3.20) and (3.22) imply, respectively, (3.23) and
Solve (3.23) and (3.24) for D 1 and D 2 to get 25) and
(3.27)
We next show that (3.27) has a unique root v 0 /v b > 1. First, note that if v 0 /v b = 1, then the left-hand-side of (3.27) equals c/b − w b < c/b. Next, note that as v 0 /v b → ∞, the left-hand-side of (3.27) goes to infinity if
which we will show is true when we find w b . Finally, by taking the derivative of the lefthand-side of (3.27) with respect to v 0 /v b > 1, one can show that the left-hand-side of (3.27) is increasing if (3.28) holds.
Once we have the solution v 0 /v b > 1 of equation (3.27), we can substitute it into (3.21) via D 1 and D 2 and solve for v 0 as follows:
(3.29)
Then, we can get v b from In particular, we compute h b (w l ), from which β b follows.
Lemma 3.5. w b is the unique solution of
Proof. By assumed smoothness of h b , the differential equation (2.35) holds at w = w b , with h b substituted for h 0 ; specifically,
Into equation (3.32), substitute
; thus, (3.34) becomes (3.31). Note that the right-hand-side of (3.31) is of the same form as z given in (2.43) with r replaced by b, so denote the function implied by the right-hand-side of (3.31) by z b . Thus, It remains for us to show that y intersects z b uniquely. First, suppose that y intersects
. From the proof of Lemma 2.6, we have that
The right-hand-side of (3.35) is positive, so if µ+b 2λ
≥ 1, then we have our contradiction.
Therefore, suppose µ+b 2λ < 1, from which it follows as in the proof of Lemma 2.6 that
On the other hand, In a corollary to Lemma 3.5, we assert that inequality (3.28) holds. Next, we show that if h b solves (3.8) and the corresponding boundary conditions, then the optimal investment in the risky asset is equal to the current wealth. We state this formally in the following proposition. 
(3.38)
Proof. Consider the parabolas f 1 and f 2 defined by
and
The minimum of f 1 for π ≥ w occurs at π = w if f ′ 1 (w) ≥ 0, which is true if y < z b on (w b , w l ). From the proof of Lemma 3.5, this latter condition is true. The minimum of f 2 for π ≤ w occurs at π = w if f ′ 2 (w) ≤ 0, which is true if y > z on (w b , w l ). From Lemma 2.6, this latter condition is true. Therefore, the minimum of the expression on the left-hand-side of (3.38) occurs at π = w. QED Parallel to Proposition 3.8, we have the following proposition that asserts that the optimal investment in the risky asset on (0, w b ) exceeds the current wealth; therefore, the individual does borrow money when wealth is less than w b .
Proposition 3.9. On (0, w b ), the optimal policy α b satisfies
Proof. α b (w) > w if and only if
By substituting forh in (3.42) and by using the expressions in (3.25) and (3.26) for D 1 and D 2 , respectively, we obtain the following equivalent inequality.
(3.43)
At v = v b , the left-hand-side of (3.43) equals c/b. Therefore, if the left-hand-side of (3.43) increases with respect to v/v b , then we are done. The derivative of the left-hand-side of (3.43) is positive if and only if inequality (3.28) holds (which we know to be true from Corollary 3.6) and if
(3.44)
By simplifying inequality (3.44), one can show that it is equivalent to
In order to show inequality (3.45), we consider two cases: (µ + b)/(2λ) ≥ 1, and
because we replaced w b with something larger. Now, inequality (3.46) reduces to 47) which is true by assumption.
as in inequality (3.37). Thus, inequality (3.45) holds if
because we replaced w b with something larger. The left-hand-side of inequality (3.49) reduces to 0, so we are done. QED
Theorem 3.10. For constant consumption c(w) = c, the borrowing level w b is given by Lemma 3.5, and the lending level is (2.33). The minimum probability of ruin ψ b is given by 50) in which h b is obtained as described in Proposition 3.7; 
The optimal investment strategy is given by During the remainder of this section, we examine the limit of the optimal investment strategy as the borrowing rate b approaches the drift on the risky asset µ from the left. We show that the optimal investment strategy approaches that in the no-borrowing case if µ ≤ λ; however, if µ > λ, then the amount invested in the risky asset is arbitrarily large for wealth near zero. Thus, instead of reducing leveraging by imposing a higher borrowing rate, leveraging actually increases if µ > λ.
We begin with the following lemma. Proof. We prove this lemma by considering lim b→µ− w b = w µ . We show that w µ = 0 when ψ 0 has no inflection point, that is, when ψ 0 is convex on (0, c/r). This occurs when µ ≤ λ. Similarly, we show that w µ > 0 when ψ 0 changes concavity; w µ is the inflection point of ψ 0 in this case. This occurs when µ > λ.
Recall that for µ > b ≥ r, y intersects z b at w = 0 and at w = w b ∈ (0, w l ] with y > z b on (0, w b ). By continuity of y, if we take the limit as b approaches µ from the left, then y will intersect z µ at w = 0 and at w = w µ ≥ 0 with y > z µ on (0, w µ ), in which z µ (w) = (µ/λ)w − c/λ. Note that (0, w µ ) is empty if w µ = 0.
Calculate y ′′ (0) by differentiating equation (2.44) twice and evaluating the result at 
(3.54)
Let v = v 0 in this expression, which corresponds to wealth equal to 0. From equation (3.27), this expression becomes
(3.55)
Now, as b approaches µ from the left, µ−b σ 2 B 2 goes to 0; however, v 0 /v b is greater than 1 and B 1 goes to infinity. Thus, the expression in (3.55) goes to infinity, and we are done.
QED
It is quite interesting that the limiting behavior of ψ b and π * b depends on the relative values of the drift on the risky asset and the hazard rate. If the drift on the risky asset is less than the hazard rate, then as the borrowing rate approaches the drift on the risky asset, the individual borrows less and less. The probability of dying is great enough that she does not need to take on the risk of borrowing in order to avoid running out of money before dying. On the other hand, if the drift on the risky asset is greater than the hazard rate, then because she has to pay more interest, she gets less value from her leverage than at lower interest rates and therefore borrows more and more.
In Section 4, we present numerical examples that demonstrate the results of this section.
Proportional Consumption
In this section, we consider the case for which the consumption rate is proportional to wealth c(w) = pw, in which r ≤ b < min(µ, p). Note that if we specify that ruin occurs if wealth reaches 0, then the individual with this consumption function does not ruin.
Therefore, for this case, as in Section 2.3, we say that ruin occurs when wealth reaches w 0 > 0; that is, let τ 0 in definition (2.3) be the (first) time that wealth reaches w 0 .
(vi) g b (0) = 1, and lim w→∞ g b (w) = 0.
Under the above conditions, the minimum probability of the lifetime ruin ψ 0 is given by (3.56) and the optimal investment strategy in the risky asset π * 0 is given by
As in the proof of Theorem 2.9, we can show that g b is given by 58) for some a > 0. From items (ii) through (v) of Theorem 3.13, we have that a solves
(3.59)
The function f 1 given by f 1 (γ) = −(µ−r) (3.60) from which it follows that a = a r in (2.57).
Case 2: 
from which it follows that a = k in (2.60).
We summarize the results of this section in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.14. The minimum probability of ruin is given by 63) in which a > 0 is given by
We have the following corollary of Theorem 3.14 that gives us the limit of ψ b and π * b as b approaches min(µ, p). In words, the b = r case is the limit of the borrowing case as the borrowing rate b approaches the rate of return r on the riskless asset. Also, the no-borrowing case is the limit of the borrowing case as the borrowing rate approaches the minimum of the proportion consumed and the drift on the risky asset.
Finally, we indicate how the results of this section are related to those under the same financial model for an individual who maximizes her expected discounted utility of consumption, when the utility function exhibits CRRA. We give the parameter values of the utility maximization problem that lead to identical consumption and investment strategies as we found for the individual who minimizes her probability of lifetime ruin.
As in Section 2.3, let β = λ + p. From Fleming and Zariphopoulou (1991) , we can show that (i) If µ−r σ 2 1 a r +1 < 1, then the investor who minimizes her probability of lifetime ruin behaves as a CRRA utility maximizer with η = −a r , or equivalently, with CRRA = 1 + a r .
, then the investor who minimizes her probability of lifetime ruin behaves as a CRRA utility maximizer with η = −k, or equivalently, with CRRA = 1 + k. 
Numerical Example
In this section, we present a numerical example to demonstrate the results in Sections 2.2 and 3.2. Because the probabilities of ruin and optimal investment strategies are explicitly or implicitly analytical, they are easy to implement with mathematical software.
Assume that real consumption is given by c(w) = c; that is, consumption is a constant (real) dollar rate. By giving the riskless rate r, the borrowing rate b, and the drift of the risky asset µ in real terms, we thereby model constant consumption in terms of real dollars. Assume the following parameter values:
• λ = 0.04; the hazard rate is constant such that the expected future lifetime is 25 years.
• r = 0.02; the riskless rate of return is 2% over inflation.
• b = 0.04; the borrowing rate is 4% over inflation.
• µ = 0.06; the risky asset's drift is 6% over inflation.
• σ = 0.20; the risky asset's volatility is 20%.
• c = 1; the individual consumes one unit of wealth per year.
In this example, the lending level w l = 14.64 and the borrowing level w b = 10.62. Thus, in the no-borrowing case, the individual will invest π * 0 (w) = w in the risky asset when w ≤ 14.64 and will invest less than her wealth when w > 14.64. In the case for which the individual is allowed to borrow at the real rate of 4%, the individual will borrow money when w < 10.62, will invest exactly her wealth in the risky asset when 10.62 ≤ w ≤ 14.64, and will invest less than her wealth when w > 14.64. See Figure 1 for a graph of the functions y, z, and z b . Note that y > z for 0 < w < 14.64, y > z b for 0 < w < 10.62, and y < z b for 10.62 < w < 14.64, as expected from Lemma 3.5. For w > 14.64, the three graphs are identical. For w ≤ 14.64, ζ 0 ≡ 0, so it is difficult to see; similarly, for ζ b on the interval [10.62, 14.64] . Notice that for w < 10.62, the graph of the amount borrowed under the b = 0.04 case is steeper than under the case for which b = r = 0.02. For wealth near zero, the individual borrows more money when the borrowing rate is higher because she does not derive as much benefit from the leveraging when she pays more interest on the amount she borrows. In this paper, we consider an investment decision problem for an individual who seeks to minimize the probability of outliving her wealth under borrowing constraints. We consider two market models with different borrowing constraints. In the first model, the individual is prohibited from borrowing, whereas in the second model, the individual borrows at a rate that is higher than the rate earned on a (positive) investment in the riskless asset. The individual either consumes at a constant (real) dollar rate, or she consumes a constant proportion of her wealth. In each case, we find the minimum probability of lifetime ruin together with the optimal investment strategy.
Under the no-borrowing constraint, when the consumption function is constant, the optimal investment strategy turns out to be a truncated version of the optimal investment strategy in the unconstrained case. The wealth level above which the individual invests a positive amount in the riskless asset, "the lending level," turns out to be the same as it is under the unconstrained case. Below that level, the optimal investment strategy prescribes to put all the wealth in the risky asset. In the market model with different borrowing and lending rates, when the consumption function is constant, the individual will borrow money to invest in the risky asset when the current wealth is lower than some "borrowing level," will invest money in the riskless asset when her current wealth is higher than some "lending level" (which is greater than the borrowing level and is equal to the lending level in the case for which b = r), and will invest all her money in the risky asset if her current wealth is between the borrowing level and the lending level.
Somewhat surprisingly, the model with a higher borrowing rate does not always converge to the model with the no-borrowing constraint as the borrowing rate goes to the drift of the risky asset. It turns out that the convergence holds only if the hazard rate of the individual is greater than or equal to the drift of the risky asset. On the other hand, when the hazard rate is lower than the drift of the risky asset, the risk of running out of money before dying is great enough for low wealth that the individual borrows increasingly more money as the borrowing rate increases.
In both of the market models, when the consumption rate is proportional to the wealth, the individual who minimizes the probability of lifetime ruin behaves like an individual who maximizes her discounted utility of consumption under the same borrowing constraint when the utility function exhibits constant relative risk aversion (CRRA).
When we include life annuities in the financial market model, the probability of ruin decreases since the price of an annuity that guarantees the fixed consumption rate is less than the wealth over which the lifetime ruin probability is zero ("the safe level") (Milevsky, Moore, and Young, 2004) . Therefore, in future work, we will extend our market model to include life annuities and determine the optimal investment allocations among risky and riskless assets and life annuities for an individual who minimizes her probability of lifetime ruin under borrowing constraints assumed here. We also would like to extend our results to the more realistic case in which the hazard rate is time varying and apply the optimal stopping formulation developed in Milevsky, Moore, and Young (2004) to solve the problem given in this paper with borrowing constraints.
Also, comonotonicity and its applications to finance and insurance have been extensively studied by Goovaerts, Dhaene, Kaas, Denuit, and their co-workers; for example, see Dhaene et al. (2005) and Vanduffel, Dhaene, and Goovaerts (2005) . Amongst other applications, they propose comonotonic approximations to tackle multi-period optimal portfolio selection problems under very flexible deterministic saving and consumption patterns.
Their techniques might be useful to apply in our setting under more realistic modeling assumptions, such as random interest rates, more general risky asset price processes, and random consumption processes. 
